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ARTICLE

The Politics of Religious Freedom in
Malaysia
TAMIR MOUSTAFA†

For the past several decades, Malaysian courts have stood at the
center of heated debates concerning freedom of religion.
Conventional accounts trace these tensions to the rise of the dakwah
(religious revival) movement, which has been the most dynamic
social and political trend since the late 1970s. According to this
understanding, legal controversies around religious freedom are the
result of a clash between competing ideological trends—specifically,
a standoff between an ascendant religious movement and a liberal
legal order. In this view, conflict is understood as originating from
outside the courts. And, framed this way, the question that naturally
follows is whether the courts have the ability and resolve to uphold
religious liberty, or if they will succumb to popular political
pressure.1 This understanding of the root problem (religious revival)
and what is at stake (liberty) comes effortlessly because it matches
our taken–for–granted understandings of the role of law and courts in
defending fundamental liberties and sustaining secularism.
In general terms, courts are widely understood by scholars,
practitioners, and the public at large as institutions that resolve
conflict and safeguard fundamental rights such as freedom of
religion.2 But this functional understanding precludes deeper insight
into how and why religious liberty cases continually crop up in the
† Associate Professor and Stephen Jarislowsky Chair, Simon Fraser
University, Canada.
1. For an expansive argument along these lines, see generally RAN HIRSCHL,
CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY (2010) (discussing the interface of constitutionalism
and increased religiosity worldwide); JOSEPH CHINYONG LIOW, PIETY AND
POLITICS: ISLAMISM IN CONTEMPORARY MALAYSIA (2009) (providing an example
of this framing in relation to Malaysia specifically).
2. See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS (1986) (explaining the function of courts in various political systems).
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Malaysian courts. I suggest that far from resolving conflict, the
judicial system is itself a primary source of tension. Instead of
resolving legal questions, the judicial system is hard-wired to produce
legal controversies anew. Rather than simply arbitrating between
contending parties, courts exacerbated ideological cleavages. And
instead of assuaging uncertainties, courts in Malaysia repeatedly
instill a tremendous degree of uncertainty, indeterminacy, and anxiety
around the meaning and content of “religious freedom.” Ironically,
law and courts—the very instruments charged with resolving conflict
and safeguarding rights—repeatedly deliver precisely the opposite
result.
Comparative studies from diverse contexts suggest that the
indeterminacy of freedom of religion is not a uniquely Malaysian
phenomenon. Although “religious freedom” and “religious liberty”
typically elicit enthusiastic support whenever they are invoked, they
are devilishly ambiguous concepts.3 Recent scholarship examines the
many paradoxes that are embedded in the notion of religious
freedom, which typically become visible only at the moment when
law and legal institutions work to define, delimit, and give concrete
meaning to the term on the ground.4 A first clue that we need to
search for deeper meaning in the Malaysian context is the fact that
appeals to religious liberty are invoked by a variety of actors, each
working at cross-purposes. Claims to religious liberty are made by
religious minority groups (Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Sikh, Taoist,
and heterodox Muslims) vis-à-vis the Muslim majority. But so, too,
do spokespersons for the Muslim majority deploy “rights talk” vis-àvis religious minority groups. And claims to religious freedom are
not only voiced across communal lines; they are also heard within
religious communities, as individuals assert the right to religious
liberty for their own persons, whereas spokespersons of religious

3. This is to some extent a dynamic that is inherent with a broader set of
fundamental rights. See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS:
LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 5–9 (1974) (describing what
he calls a “myth of rights”).
4. See, e.g., WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM (2005). Additionally, see the work associated with the Politics of
Religion Freedom project, directed by Peter Danchin, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd,
Saba Mahmood, and Winnifred Sullivan. POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM:
CONTESTED NORMS AND LOCAL PRACTICES, http://politics-of-religiousfreedom.berkeley.edu/ (last visited May 12, 2014).
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communities simultaneously invoke religious liberty in their claim to
defend collective norms from state interference.
Take, for example, the most well-known Malaysian court case,
Lina Joy v. Religious Council of the Federal Territories,5 which
lasted for nearly a decade and became a public spectacle at home and
abroad.6 The case concerned a woman who sought state recognition
of her religious conversion.7 In litigating Joy’s right to religious
freedom, her attorneys challenged the personal status laws in force in
the Federal Territories, which provide no viable avenue for
conversion out of Islam.8 Joy’s attorneys argued that the laws
violated her right to religious freedom, a right enshrined in Article 11
of the Malaysian Constitution, which states (in part) that “Every
person has the right to profess and practice his religion….”9 But
Joy’s opponents invoked another clause from the same article, which
states that “Every religious group has the right…to manage its own
religious affairs….”10 This second set of attorneys also claimed the
right to religious freedom, but they argued that Article 11 is meant to
safeguard the ability of religious communities to craft their own rules
and regulations (including rules of entry and exit), free from outside
interference.11
It is striking that protagonists on both sides of the controversy
invoked “religious freedom” and that both sides called upon the state
to secure these alternate visions of religious freedom. The frequency
of such cases and the repeated appeal for state action by all parties
suggest that these conundrums are perhaps inevitable whenever states
attempt to adjudicate between a variety of groups and individuals,
each of them raising the banner of religious freedom. Nonetheless, it
is worth exploring whether particular legal arrangements exacerbate
5. Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan dan lain lain, [2007] 4
M.L.J. 585 (Malay.), aff’g Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah & Anor,
[2004] 2 M.L.J. 119 (Malay.).
6. See, e.g., Cris Prystay, In Malaysia, a Test for Religious Freedom, WALL ST.
J. (Aug. 25, 2006), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB115645160096844802.
7. Lina Joy, [2007] 4 M.L.J. at 592–93.
8. See id. at 593 (stating that Joy challenged “the constitutionality of the state
and federal legislations that forbade conversion out of Islam”).
9. See Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan, [2005] 6 M.L.J.
193, 198 (Malay.) (arguing that Article 11 gave her the freedom to convert to
Christianity, which was a freedom that could not be restricted by any law).
10. Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah & Anor., [2004] 2 M.L.J. 119,
126 (Malay.).
11. See id. (finding that there would be “chaos and confusion” if plaintiff did
not address her renunciation of Islam with the religious authority who has a right to
manage its own affairs under Article 11(3) prior to her conversion).
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the frequency and intensity of these sorts of legal dilemmas. In the
case of Malaysia, two factors are particularly crucial. The first is that
Malaysia regulates religion far more than most other countries. By
one measure, Malaysia ranks sixth out of 175 countries worldwide in
the degree of state regulation of religion.12 As a result, one’s official
religious status is not a trivial matter—it has legal implications for
who one can marry, whether or not (and how) one may worship, and
myriad other rules and regulations. As I show in the analysis that
follows, such extensive regulation tends to generate its own tensions,
legal and otherwise. A second institutional factor that exacerbates
these legal dilemmas is the bifurcation of the Malaysian judicial
system into “civil” and “shariah” tracks. In theory, these two
jurisdictions operate independent of one another, with the civil courts
adjudicating family disputes among non-Muslims and “shariah”
courts handling family law disputes for Muslims. In practice,
however, there are cases in which the two jurisdictions collide.
The case of Shamala v. Jayaganesh13 underlines this problem.
Shamala and Jayaganesh were married with children when
Jayaganesh converted to Islam and initiated divorce from his wife.14
Because husband and wife fell under the jurisdiction of different
courts following Jayanganesh’s conversion, they each secured
custody orders from alternate jurisdictions.15 Shamala’s custody order
came from the civil courts because she fell under civil court
jurisdiction, whereas Jayanganesh secured his custody order from the
shariah courts.16 The two court orders came to different conclusions
about the custody of the children and neither parent was able to
contest the competing court order as the result of legal standing
requirements in the civil and shariah courts. As with Lina Joy,
Shamala produced a political crisis and became a focal point for

12. This is the ranking for 2002 according to the cross-national Government
Involvement in Religion measure developed by Jonathan Fox. JONATHAN FOX, A
WORLD SURVEY OF RELIGION AND THE STATE 184 (2008). It should be noted that
Fox’s study may underestimate the level of regulation in Malaysia, as several
indicators appear to be miscoded, including the appointment and funding of clergy,
forced observance, religious education, religious basis of personal status laws and
restrictions on the publication of religious materials, among others.
13. Shamala Sathiyaseelan v. Jeyaganesh C. Mogarajah, [2004] 2 M.L.J. 648
(Malay.).
14. Id. at 648.
15. Id. at 653.
16. Id.
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competing politicians and civil society groups, each rallying around
the banner of “religious liberty.”
In the analysis that follows, I examine Lina Joy and Shamala to
show that the politics of religious freedom in Malaysia has little to do
with “religion” and far more to do with the inherent ambiguities of
religious liberty, coupled with specific institutional features of the
Malaysian judiciary. Through an examination of the juridification of
religious law and the institutional development of the Malaysian
judiciary, I show that the root causes of these controversies are not of
recent vintage, but rather were set in motion under British colonial
rule more than a century ago.
I.

A LEGACY OF COLONIALISM: “RACE”
CATEGORIES OF GOVERNANCE

AND

“RELIGION”

AS

Malaysia is famously known for its vibrant multi-ethnic and
multi-religious communities. The ethnic-Malay community is
overwhelmingly Muslim and constitutes just over half of Malaysia’s
total population of 30 million.17 The second largest ethnic community
is Chinese, which stands at approximately 25% of the total
population.18 Most ethnic-Chinese identify as Buddhist (76%), with
substantial numbers identifying as Taoist (11%) and Christian
(10%).19 The third largest ethnic group is Indian and stands at
approximately 8% of the total population.20 This community is also
religiously diverse, with most Indian Malaysians following Hinduism
(85%) and smaller numbers practicing Christianity (7.7%) and Islam
(3.8%).21 The overall breakdown of the population according to
religion is approximately 60% Muslim, 19% Buddhist, 9% Christian,
6% Hindu, and 5% of other faiths. 22
17. See POPULATION PROJECTION, MALAYSIA 2010–2040: SUMMARY
FINDINGS,
DEP’T
STATISTICS
MALAY.
1,
3,
available
at
http://www.statistics.gov.my/portal/im
ages/stories/files/LatestReleases/population/Ringkasan_Penemuan-Sum
mary_Findings_2010-2040.pdf (last updated Jan. 18, 2013). The ethnic-Malay
community is legally (indeed constitutionally) defined as Muslim. MALAY. FED.
CONST., Nov. 1, 2010, art. 160(2). According to Malaysian state law and official
census figures, every ethnic-Malay, to a person, is Muslim.
18. POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND BASIC DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTIC
REPORT 2010, DEP’T STATISTICS MALAY. 5 (2011), available at http://www.statisti
cs.gov.my/portal/download_Population/files/census2010/Taburan_Penduduk_
dan_Ciri-ciri_Asas_Demografi.pdf.
19. Id. at 82–98.
20. Id. at 5.
21. Id. at 82–98.
22. Id. at 9.
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This multi-ethnic and multi-religious composition is largely the
result of British commercial and colonial domination that began in
the nineteenth century.23 Laborers were brought from China by the
hundreds of thousands to work in the tin industry and the British
turned to India for cheap labor to run vast rubber plantations.24
Colonial policy tended to overlook the tremendous ethnic and
linguistic diversity internal to these groupings and economic roles
were assigned according to “race.”25
The term “race” may raise eyebrows among some readers. It is
used here for analytical rather than normative purposes to mark a
distinct shift in the way that difference was encoded in state law
beginning in the colonial period as a means to justify the social and
economic hierarchies that were part and parcel of the colonial project.
Laura Gomez explains the analytical utility of the term “race” with
her observation that “both race and ethnicity are about socially
constructed group difference in society [but] race is always about
hierarchical social difference….”26 The term “race” thus captures a
power dimension that tends to fall out of the picture in discussions of
“ethnicity.” In using the term, it is important to be clear that I
subscribe to the three components of the constructionist view of race
outlined by Gomez: (1) a biological basis for race is rejected; (2) race
is viewed as a social construct that changes along with political,

23. Parts of the Malay Peninsula were multiethnic when British commercial
interests first arrived on the scene, but economic forces accelerated the rate of
demographic change.
24. While most accounts of migration to the Malay Peninsula focus on the
influx of Chinese and Indian workers, there was also significant Malay migration
through this period. By 1931, nearly half of Malays in the former protectorates
“were either first generation arrivals from the Netherlands East Indies or
descendants of Indonesian migrants who had arrived after 1891.” BARBARA
ANDAYA & LEONARD ANDAYA, A HISTORY OF MALAYSIA 184 (2001). And just as
Chinese and Indian migrants were a mix of various ethnic and linguistic groups, the
“Malay” community was similarly diverse.
25. Particularly revealing is how census categories merged over time, both
during the colonial era and after, reflecting (and reinforcing) new political and
social categories. See Charles Hirschman, The Making of Race in Colonial Malaya:
Political Economy and Racial Ideology, 1 SOC. F. 330 (1986).
26. Laura E. Gómez, Understanding Law and Race as Mutually Constitutive:
An Invitation to Explore an Emerging Field, 6 ANN. R. L. & SOC. SCI. 487, 490
(2010).
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economic, and other context; and, (3) “although race is socially
constructed… [it] has real consequences.”27
As in other times and places, the legal construction of “race”
tended to serve economic and political objectives. For example, the
Malay Reservations Act set land aside for ethnic-Malays to use in
“traditional” agricultural pursuits, first among them rice cultivation.
Although the Act was made in the name of preserving “the Malay
way of life,” its underlying objective was to limit the expansion of
ethnic-Chinese business interests, to bar ethnic-Malays from
competing in the lucrative rubber industry, and to preserve adequate
food supplies in the colony. The official and unofficial basis for the
legal definition of “Malay” was thus context-specific, but the legal
category acquired increasing political salience as Malays were
granted exclusive access to positions in the civil service, special
business permits, government scholarships, and lucrative government
contracts under the late colonial administration. The Malay
Reservations Act defined a Malay as “any person belonging to the
‘Malayan race’ who habitually spoke Malay … and who professed
Islam.”28 The racial category of “Malayan” or “Malay” was therefore
legally fused with the religious designation, “Muslim.” The fused
racial/religious category, first borne in the colonial era, remains
virtually unchanged until the present day, as enshrined in Article
160(2) of the Malaysian Federal Constitution.29 Religious categories
are thus defined and regulated by state law and thoroughly
intertwined with the politics of race and access to state resources.
Often in tacit cooperation or coordination with indigenous elites,
the British developed personal status laws for the various ethnic and
religious communities under its control. “Anglo-Hindu law” was
developed and applied to Hindu subjects; “Chinese customary law”
was developed and applied to Chinese subjects; and “Anglo-Muslim
law” was developed and applied to Muslim subjects in matters of
family law.30 While these legal regimes had some basis in local
religious and customary norms, codification and application by a
27. Id. at 491.
28. ANDAYA & ANDAYA, supra note 24, at 183.
29. Article 160 (2) defines “Malay” as “a person who professes the religion of
Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language, [and] conforms to Malay custom.”
MALAY. FED. CONST., art. 160 (2).
30. See generally M.B. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO
COLONIAL AND NEO-COLONIAL LAWS (1975) (discussing Anglo–Hindu law,
Chinese customary law, and Anglo–Muslim law in British Malaysia and
elsewhere).
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centralized state was a significant departure from local practice. To
underline this point and provide essential context for the cases
examined later in this study, it is worth exploring the development of
“Anglo-Muslim law” in British Malaya in further detail.
First, it is important to note that to the extent that the Islamic
legal tradition was practiced in the pre-colonial Malay Peninsula, it
was socially embedded and marked by tremendous variability across
time and place.31 Religious leaders were not part of a centralized state
apparatus.32 Instead, they were “members of village communities
who, for reasons of exceptional piety or other ability, had been
chosen by the community to act as imam of the local mosque….”33
As in other Muslim-majority areas, the colonial period marked a key
turning point for the institutionalization and centralization of
religious authority.34
The British first issued a “Muhammadan Marriage Ordinance” to
regulate Muslim family law in the Straits Settlements in 1880.35 And
with British assistance and encouragement, similar Muhammadan
marriage and divorce enactments went into force in Perak (1885),
Kedah (1913), Kelantan (1915), and most other states of British
Malaya. “Anglo-Muslim law” incorporated select fragments of fiqh
(classical Islamic jurisprudence), but carried epistemological
assumptions and organizing principles that were based on English
common law and entirely distinct from usul al-fiqh, the legal method
31. See generally Donald L. Horowitz, The Qur’an and the Common Law:
Islamic Law Reform and the Theory of Legal Change, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 233,
236–37 (1994).
32. See WILLIAM R. ROFF, THE ORIGINS OF MALAY NATIONALISM 67 (1967)
(“In the realm of religious belief, as in that of political organization, the Malay state
as a rule lacked the resources necessary for centralization of authority.”).
33. Id.
34. Key studies of this transformation include ROFF, supra note 32; Horowitz,
supra note 31; M.B. HOOKER, supra note 30.
35. The British first gained control of port cities for the purpose of trade and
commerce in Penang (1786), Singapore (1819), and Malacca (1824). Together, the
three outposts formed the Straits Settlements, which were later ruled directly as a
formal Crown colony beginning in 1867. Separately, Britain established
protectorates in what would come to be known as the Federated Malay States of
Perak, Negeri Sembilan, Pahang, and Selangor, and the Unfederated Malay States
of Johor, Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, and Terengganu. By the early twentieth century,
all of the territory of the Malay Peninsula was brought under similar agreements as
Britain sought to extend its control and local rulers sought accommodation as a
means to consolidate their own power vis-à-vis local competitors.
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undergirding classical Islamic jurisprudence.36 As M.B. Hooker
explains, “the classical syarî’ah is not the operative law and has not
been since the colonial period. ‘Islamic law’ is really Anglo-Muslim
law; that is, the law that the state makes applicable to Muslims.”37
The Islamic legal tradition was thus “secularized” in the sense that it
was formalized, codified, and institutionalized as an instrument of the
modern state. By the beginning of the twentieth century, “a
classically-trained Islamic jurist would be at a complete loss with this
Anglo-Muslim law” whereas “a common lawyer with no knowledge
of Islam would be perfectly comfortable.”38
Separate courts for Muslim subjects were established as a
subordinate part of the judicial system with jurisdiction limited to
family law matters and rulings subject to appeal before the High
Courts, which functioned according to English common law. As in its
other colonial holdings, the British thus shaped the emergence of a
bifurcated legal system. This bifurcation of the judicial system
continued after independence in 1957. The federal civil courts
continued to administer commercial, criminal, and administrative
law, and personal status law for non-Muslims. State-level Muslim
Courts (rebranded “Shariah Courts” in 1976) exercised jurisdiction
over Muslims in the area of personal status law and certain defined
aspects of criminal law. Shariah court rulings were subject to review
by the federal civil courts, but the civil courts exercised this
jurisdiction only on occasion. Nonetheless, the government amended
the Federal Constitution in 1988 to bar the federal civil courts from
overturning state level shariah court rulings. Article 121(1A) declared
that the High Courts of the Federation “shall have no jurisdiction in
any respect of any matter within the jurisdiction of the Shariah
courts.”39 In theory, Article 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution
demarcated a clean division between the civil courts and the shariah
courts. Muslims would henceforth be exclusively subject to the
jurisdiction of the shariah courts in matters related to religion while
non-Muslims would remain subject to the jurisdiction of the civil

36. See WAEL HALLAQ, SHARIA: THEORY, PRACTICE, TRANSFORMATIONS
(2009) (providing a comprehensive study of usul al-fiqh and its subversion by
modern state law); Tamir Moustafa, Judging in God’s Name: State Power,
Secularism, and the Politics of Islamic Law in Malaysia, 3 OXFORD J. L. AND
RELIGION 152 (2014) (examining these developments in contemporary Malaysia).
37. M.B. Hooker, Introduction: Islamic Law in South–East Asia, 4 AUSTL. J.
ASIAN L. 213, 218 (2002).
38. Id.
39. MALAY. FED. CONST., art. 121 (1A).
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courts.40 In practice, however, dozens of cases presented vexing legal
questions.
II.

LINA JOY V. RELIGIOUS COUNCIL OF THE FEDERAL TERRITORIES

Perhaps the most controversial Malaysian court case of all time
concerned a Malay woman who sought state recognition of her
conversion to Christianity so that she could marry a non-Muslim. The
reader will recall that different personal status laws had been
developed for various ethnic and religious communities in British
Malaya. The separate family law regimes for non-Muslim
communities were repealed and folded into a single Marriage and
Reform Act in 1976, leaving Muslim family law as the only distinct
body of family law, institutionally entrenched in state-level Muslim
courts. These separate jurisdictions for Muslim and non-Muslim
family law left no official route for marriage between Muslims and
non-Muslims.41 The only route to marriage was for the non-Muslim
partner to convert to Islam or for the Muslim partner to change his or
her legal name. A name change served as a way for star-crossed
lovers to circumvent the letter of the law because a person’s religion
was simply assumed by the legally registered name.
In 1997, the woman who would eventually come to be known as
Lina Joy applied to change her name from Azlina bte Jailani (a
Muslim name) to Lina Lelani (a non-Muslim name) so that she could
enter into marriage with her non-Muslim partner.42 However, the
administrative unit charged with processing such requests, the
National Registration Department (NRD), rejected her application.43
Azlina filed a second application, this time to change the name on her
National Identity Card to “Lina Joy.”44 The National Registration
Department approved the second request, but Joy’s replacement
40. Schedule Nine of the Federal Constitution sets out the areas of law that fall
within the jurisdiction of state-level shariah courts. Id.
41. It should be observed that these legal restrictions do not conform to
classical Islamic jurisprudence, which holds that marriage between a Muslim man
and a non-Muslim woman (Christian or Jewish) is permissible. It is the bifurcated
structure of the legal system rather than religious prohibition that is the source of
tension.
42. Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan dan lain-lain, [2007]
4 M.L.J. 585, 592 (Malay.).
43. Id. (providing no reason for the rejection of her application).
44. Id. She explained in both applications that she had converted to
Christianity and that she intended to marry a Christian man. Id. at 593. It is likely
that this statement raised alarms among those in the NRD.
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identity card now recorded her official religion as “Islam.”45 The
statement of official religion was the result of a new administrative
procedure designed to close the loophole that had enabled Muslims to
effectively sidestep the state’s regulation of religion by way of a
name change.46 Lina Joy filed a third application, this time to remove
the word “Islam” from her identity card, but the NRD refused to
accept her application without certification from a shariah court that
she was no longer a Muslim.47
Joy chose not to pursue this avenue because it had been an
administrative dead-end for others before her.48 Instead, Joy initiated
a lawsuit against the National Registration Department and the
Religious Council of the Federal Territories.49 Joy’s attorney,
Benjamin Dawson, pointed to Article 11(1) of the Malaysian
Constitution, which states, “Every person has the right to profess and
practice his religion….” Dawson argued that Article 11 gave Joy
alone the freedom to declare her religion and that she had no
obligation to seek certification from a third party.50 The counsel for
the government argued that the court should dismiss the petition
because conversion out of Islam was a legal matter that lay within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the shariah courts as opposed to the civil
courts. They argued that Article 121(1A) clearly provided that the
civil courts “shall have no jurisdiction in any respect of any matter
within the jurisdiction of the Shariah courts.”51

45. Id. at 593.
46. P.U. (A) 70/2000 came into force retroactively on Oct. 1, 1999. Id.
Although it is impossible to know with certainty, the timing of the rule change and
their retroactive effect suggests that these regulations were issued as a direct result
of Lina Joy’s application, and that the new regulations were intended to close the
loophole that had enabled conversion by way of name change.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Soon Singh v. Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM)
Kedah & Anor [1994] 1 M.L.J. 690, 693–94 (Malay.) (holding that plaintiff was
still a Muslim until a declaration was made by a shariah court that he was not); Md
Hakim Lee v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan, Kuala Lumpur, [1998] 1
M.L.J. 681 (Malay.).
49. Lina Joy, [2007] 4 M.L.J. at 593.
50. Joy’s attorneys challenged the constitutionality of Article 2 of the
Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act of 1993 and related state
enactments. They also claimed that the Shariah Criminal Offences Act of 1997 and
related State Enactments were not applicable to the plaintiff who was now a
Christian. Id.
51. MALAY. FED. CONST. art. 121(1A).
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Relying on court precedent, Judge Faiza Tamby Chik agreed that
the matter lay within the jurisdiction of the shariah courts.52
Furthermore, he addressed the constitutional provisions on freedom
of religion, explaining that Joy’s fundamental freedoms were not
violated if one understands that the true intent of Article 11 is to
protect the freedom of religious communities rather than for
individuals to profess and practice the religion of their choice.53 To
support this interpretation, Judge Tamby Chik pointed to other
clauses in Article 11 of the Federal Constitution, including clause 3,
which states: “Every religious group has the right…to manage its
own religious affairs….”54 The true meaning of freedom of religion,
the judge explained, is that religious authorities should be left to
regulate their own internal matters without outside interference.55
Judge Tamby Chik explained in his ruling that:
When a Muslim wishes to renounce/leave the religion
of Islam, his other rights and obligations as a Muslim
will also be jeopardized and this is an affair of Muslim
[sic] falling under the first defendant’s jurisdiction….
Even though the first part [of article 11] provides that
every person has the right to profess and practice his
religion, this does not mean that the plaintiff can hide
behind this provision without first settling the issue of
renunciation of her religion (Islam) with the religious
52. Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah & Anor, [2004] 2 M.L.J. 119,
129. (Malay.) (“Her purported renunciation of Islam can only be determined by the
Shariah Courts and not the Civil Courts pursuant to art. 121(1A).”).
53. See id. at 133 (stating that Article 11 was “created for the harmony and
well-being of the multi-racial and multi-religious communities of this country”).
This decision departed from earlier rulings by the civil courts in Ng Wan Chan v.
Islamic Religious Council of the Federal Territories, [1991] 3 M.L.J. 487 (Malay.)
and Dalip Kaur v. Pegawai Polis Daerah, Balai Polis Daerah, Bukit Mertajam,
[1992] 1 M.L.J. 1 (Malay.). In both cases, the civil courts took the position that
only issues expressly conferred to the jurisdiction of the shariah courts would
remain in their jurisdiction. Lina Joy, [2004] 2 M.L.J. at 133. This principle
changed just prior to Lina Joy in a decision involving a Sikh man (Soon Singh)
who wished to change his religious designation after having converted to Islam as a
teenager. Soon Singh v. Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (Perkim) Kedah,
[1994] 1 M.L.J. 690 (Malay.). In this case, the civil courts adopted a new doctrine
of implied jurisdiction vis-à-vis the shariah courts, effectively providing the shariah
courts with exclusive jurisdiction over such matters. Id. at 693.
54. Lina Joy, [2004] 2 M.L.J. at 126 (citing MALAY. FED. CONST. art.
11(3)(a)).
55. Id. at 126.
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authority which has the right to manage its own
religious affairs under art 11 (3) (a) of the FC.56
What is most striking for our purpose is the fact that “freedom of
religion” was invoked by advocates on both sides of this legal
struggle. Joy and her supporters insisted on her right to individual
religious freedom while her opponents insisted on religious liberty of
another sort: freedom of the Muslim community to maintain its own
norms (including rules of entry and exit) without state interference.
Having lost the battle in the High Court, Joy’s attorneys changed
their strategy and focused on the narrow administrative question of
whether the Director General of the National Registration
Department had overstepped his bounds by requiring certification
from a Shariah Court.57 It did not go unnoticed that the 2-1 split
decision mirrored the emerging religious divide in Malaysian society.
Two Muslim justices, Abdul Aziz Mohamad and Arifin Zakaria,
wrote the majority opinion while Gopal Sri Ram, a non-Muslim,
wrote the dissenting opinion.58 Judges Abdul Aziz Mohamad and
Arifin Zakaria took the position that whether or not a person had
renounced Islam is “a question of Islamic law that was not within the
jurisdiction of the NRD and that the NRD was not equipped or
qualified to decide.”59 The dissenting judgment from Judge Gopal Sri
Ram took the position that “an order or certificate from the Syariah
Court was not a relevant document for the processing of the
appellant’s application. It was not a document prescribed by the 1990
Regulations.”60 Judge Sri Ram concluded that, “[w]here a public
decision-maker takes extraneous matters into account, his or her
decision is null and void and of no effect.”61
Having lost in the Court of Appeal, Joy and her attorneys had
one final opportunity in the highest appellate court, the Federal Court
of Malaysia. Watching briefs were held by NGOs on both sides of the
case. The Bar Council, the National Human Rights Society
(HAKAM), and the Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism,
Christianity, Hinduism, and Sikhism held watching briefs on behalf
of Lina Joy, while conservative Muslim organizations submitted

56. Id. at 125.
57. Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan, [2005] 6 M.L.J.
193, 199 (Malay.).
58. Id. at 198, 214.
59. Id. at 208–09.
60. Id. at 219 (Gopal Sri Ram, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 220.
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watching briefs of their own.62 In a 2-1 split decision, the 53-page
ruling reproduced the same fault lines that were present in the Court
of Appeal.63 Chief Justice Ahmad Fairuz and Justice Alauddin
presented a technical rationale for the NRD’s actions.64 The
dissenting judgment from Richard Malanjum, on the other hand,
pointed once again to the glaring lacuna in the law: “The insistence
by NRD for a certificate of apostasy from the Federal Territory
Syariah Court or any Islamic Authority was not only illegal but
unreasonable. This was because under the applicable law, the Syariah
Court in the Federal Territory has no statutory power to adjudicate on
the issue of apostasy.”65 In other words, there was a lacuna in the law.
Judge Malanjum explained that, regardless of this lacuna in the law,
in such a situation the federal courts have a constitutional duty to
protect fundamental rights, regardless of Article 121(1A):
Since constitutional issues are involved especially on
the question of fundamental rights as enshrined in the
Constitution, it is of critical importance that the civil
superior courts should not decline jurisdiction by
merely citing art 121 (1A). The article only protects
the Shariah Court in matters within their jurisdiction,
which does not include interpretation of the provisions
of the Constitution. Hence, when jurisdictional issues
arise civil courts are not required to abdicate their
constitutional function.
Legislation criminalizing
apostasy or limiting the scope of fundamental
liberties…are constitutional issues in nature which
only the civil courts have jurisdiction to determine.66
By failing to address these issues head on, the majority decision
in Lina Joy did little to address the underlying legal conundrums that
lay at the heart of all prior conversion cases. Lina Joy was a painful
reminder that the Malaysian judicial system was hard-wired to
produce these sorts of legal tensions.

62. See Tamir Moustafa, Liberal Rights Versus Islamic Law? The Construction
of a Binary in Malaysian Politics, 47 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 771, 776–77, 783 (2013).
63. Lina Joy lwn v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan dan lain-lain,
[2007] 4 M.L.J. 585, 594, 596 (Malay.).
64. See id. at 594–96.
65. Id. at 598 (Malanjum, C.J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 597–98.
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The case followed a similar fact pattern to many other
conversion cases that preceded it, but carried one unique aspect: Joy
was an ethnic Malay, whereas all prior conversion cases concerned
non-Malays who had converted to Islam and subsequently sought to
change their religious status back to their original faith. Lina Joy’s
case thus exposed a racial dimension in the equation. As part of its
ruling, the court relied on Article 160 of the Federal Constitution,
which defines Malay as “a person who professes the religion of
Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language, [and] conforms to
Malay custom….”67 Citing Article 160, the Court explained that Lina
Joy’s “race” carried legal consequences that could not be abandoned:
In her affidavit affirmed on 8 May 2000, the plaintiff
stated that her father is a Malay. His name is Jailani
bin Shariff. All his life, the father has been professing
and practising the Islamic religion. So is the mother.
Her name is Kalthum bte Omar, a Malay. Both of the
parents are still professing and practising the Islamic
religion. And being Malays they habitually speaks the
Malay language and conform to Malay custom. The
plaintiff also stated that she is raised, and grew up in a
household of Islamic belief although her belief in
Islam is shallow. In exh C, she stated that her original
name is Azlina bte Jailani as is stated in her I/C No
7220456. I therefore conclude that the plaintiff is a
Malay. By art 160 of the FC, the plaintiff is a Malay
and therefore as long as she is a Malay by that
definition she cannot renounce her Islamic religion at
all. As a Malay, the plaintiff remains in the Islamic
faith until her dying days [emphasis added].68
The ruling was a clear exposition of the conflation of Malay
racial and religious identity, both in the legal system and in the social
imaginary of contemporary Malaysia, which, as we have seen, goes
all the way back to the origins of the modern Malaysian state under
British rule. Lina Joy suggests that the state’s extensive regulation of
religion and race gave rise to festering legal conundrums.
Lina Joy is widely understood as a freedom of religion case. In
one sense, this is absolutely accurate. Joy was fighting for state
recognition of her conversion. The case was understood as a freedom
67. Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah & Anor, [2004] 2 M.L.J. 119,
132 (Malay.); MALAY. FED. CONST., art. 160.
68. Lina Joy, [2004] 2 M.L.J. at 144.
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of religion case by many in the Muslim community, too, although
this camp viewed the case as a test of shariah court autonomy vis-àvis the civil courts in multi-religious Malaysia. Yet the source of
repeated institutional friction was not merely the result of individual
versus collectivist visions of “freedom of religion.” The cases were
rooted in the institutional features of Malaysian judiciary. To gain
further traction, it is worthwhile examining another landmark case
that exposes the same institutional source of legal friction.
III. SHAMALA V. JAYAGANESH
Shamala v. Jayaganesh69 is another case that commanded
nation-wide attention. Shamala Sathiyaseelan and Jeyaganesh
Mogarajah, both Hindus, were married in 1998 under the Marriage
and Divorce Act, which governs family law for non-Muslims in
Malaysia.70 They had two children, who were considered Hindu as a
result of their parents’ religious status.71 Four years into their
marriage, Jeyanganesh converted to Islam.72 Six days after his
conversion, he registered their two children, ages two and three, as
new converts to Islam without his wife’s knowledge or consent.73
When Shamala learned of the development, she took the children to
her parents’ home and filed a petition to secure their custody.74
Shamala obtained an interim custody order from the civil courts, the
appropriate legal body for adjudicating family law disputes among
non-Muslims.75 But shortly thereafter, her husband secured an
interim custody order of his own from a shariah court on the grounds
that he and the children were now legally Muslim and therefore under
the jurisdiction of the shariah courts in matters of family law.76 The
two custody orders thus came to opposite conclusions over who had
the right to take possession of the children, yet neither husband nor
wife was able to contest the competing court order as the result of
legal standing requirements.

69. Shamala Sathiyaseelan v. Jeyaganesh C. Mogarajah, [2004] 2 M.L.J. 648
(Malay.).
70. Id. at 653.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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Shamala begged the question of which court had the ultimate
authority to determine the religious status and the custody of the
children. According to the law, the shariah courts have jurisdiction
over personal status questions involving individuals who are legally
registered as Muslim.77 Moreover, Article 121(1A) of the Federal
Constitution prevents the civil courts from reviewing shariah court
decisions.78 Yet it was undeniable that Shamala’s rights were harmed.
Married to a Hindu according to civil law, she now found herself in a
custody battle that involved the shariah courts. As with the Lina Joy,
Shamala produced a political crisis and became a focal point for
competing politicians and civil society groups, each rallying around
the banner of “religious liberty.” The case provided the spark that
ignited a full throttled campaign between liberal and conservative
activists.
Shamala’s attorney, Ravi Nekoo, made a concerted effort to
attract public attention—an effort that was facilitated by the rapidly
changing environment of civil society activism and digital media.
Nekoo was an active member in the legal aid community, and he was
well networked with a variety of rights organizations in Kuala
Lumpur. Nekoo turned to the most prominent women’s rights groups
in Kuala Lumpur: the Women’s Aid Organization, the All Women
Action Movement, the Women’s Centre for Change, Sisters in Islam,
and the Women Lawyers’ Association.79 He also turned to religious
organizations, most notably the Hindu Sangam, the Catholic Lawyers
Society, and the Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism,
Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism and Taoism (MCCBCHST).80 These
groups took an immediate interest in the case and they quickly gained
formal observer status with the High Court.81 Subsequently, they
77. Id. at 660.
78. Id. at 658. This is the standing interpretation provided by the Federal Court
through case law. In contrast, prominent liberal rights attorneys Malik Imtiaz and
Shanmuga Kanesalingam maintain that, if properly read, Article 121(1A) should
not preclude the civil courts from reviewing shariah court rulings when
fundamental liberties are in jeopardy. They argue that the weakening of formal
judicial independence made judges vulnerable to political pressures, particularly
when they are working on politically sensitive cases. According to this view, the
weak stance of the civil courts in cases involving Article 121(1A) is ultimately the
result of political pressure and insufficient judicial independence rather than
express constitutional provisions. Interview with Shanmuga Kanesalingam, in
Kuala Lumpur, Malay. (July 9, 2009); Interview with Malik Imtiaz, in Kuala
Lumpur, Malay. (Nov. 5, 2009).
79. Telephone interview with Ravi Nekoo (Feb. 18, 2012).
80. Id.
81. Id. Malik Imtiaz also held a watching brief for the Malaysian Bar Council.
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filed amicus curiae briefs and mobilized their resources to bring
public attention to the case.82
In the High Court proceedings that ensued, Shamala sought a
court order declaring the conversions of the children null and void.83
She claimed the equal right to decide the religion of the children and
objected to the unilateral conversions. However, Judge Faiza Tamby
Chik (the same judge who had issued the High Court ruling in Lina
Joy) ruled that Article 12(4) of the Constitution provides that “the
religion of a person under the age of 18 shall be decided by his parent
or guardian.”84 Judge Faiza explained that the use of the singular—
“parent”—should be taken to mean that unilateral conversion of a
minor, without the consent or even knowledge of the other parent,
was legal.85
Finding that the conversion of the children conformed to the law,
Judge Faiza moved onto the question of whether Shamala could
further challenge the new religious status of the children through the
civil courts. Here, Judge Faiza relied upon Article 121(1A) of the
Federal Constitution to argue that the civil courts did not have
jurisdiction to consider the matter:
I have come to the conclusion that by virtue of art.
121(1A) of the Federal Constitution, the Shariah Court
is the qualified forum to determine the status of the
two minors. Only the Shariah Court has the legal
expertise in hukum syarak [shariah law] to determine
whether the conversion of the two minors is valid or

82. Id.
83. Shamala Sathiyaseelan v. Jeyaganesh C. Mogarajah, [2004] 2 M.L.J. 648,
652 (Malay.).
84. Id. at 649. Judge Faiza, who had served as a language instructor before he
began his legal career, devoted several pages of his ruling to explain the grammar
and meaning of words in the singular and plural. According to Judge Faiza, we
must accept the plain meaning of the word “parent” in Article 12(4) of the Federal
Constitution. The article “uses the word ‘parent.’ It is spelt ‘p-a-r-e-n-t’ without the
[letter] ‘s.’ It is used in the singular sense.” Id. at 655.
85. Id. at 656. Other cases concerning the unilateral conversion of minors
include Teoh Eng Huat v. Kadhi, Pasir Mas, Kelantan, [1990] 2 M.L.J. 300
(Malay.); Subashini Rajasingam v. Saravanan Thangathoray, [2007] 4 M.L.J. 97
(Malay.); Indira Gandhi v. Muhammad Riduan bin Abdullah, [2013] High Court of
Malay. in Ipoh, available at http://www.loyarburok.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/
07/Indira-Gandhi-Lee-Swee-Seng-Judgment.pdf.
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not. Only the Shariah Court has the competency and
expertise to determine the said issue.86
The ruling put Shamala in a no-win situation. She had no remedy
in the civil courts nor did she have legal standing in the shariah courts
because she was not a Muslim. Even if she had wished to approach
the shariah courts for relief, it was not an avenue open to her. Judge
Faiza acknowledged the unsatisfactory result: “What then is for her
to do? The answer [is that] it is not for this court to legislate and
confer jurisdiction to the Civil Court but for Parliament to provide the
remedy.”87 Fearing that her husband would deny her joint custody,
Shamala moved to Australia with the children, never to return.88
IV. TWO VIEWS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
As a direct result of the Shamala ruling in April 2004, liberal
rights groups formed a coalition named “Article 11” after the article
of the Federal Constitution guaranteeing freedom of religion. The
coalition included such prominent organizations as the All Women’s
Action Society (AWAM), the Bar Council of Malaysia, the National
Human Rights Society (HAKAM), the Malaysian Civil Liberties
Society, Sisters in Islam, Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM), and
the Women’s Aid Organisation (WAO). The Article 11 Coalition also
included the Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism,
Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism and Taoism (MCCBCHST), an
umbrella organization representing the concerns of non-Muslim
communities in Malaysia. The objective of the Article 11 coalition
was to focus public attention on the erosion of individual rights and
to “ensure that Malaysia does not become a theocratic state.”89 The
Article 11 coalition produced a website, short documentary videos
providing firsthand interviews with non-Muslims who were adversely
affected by Article 121(1A), analysis and commentary from their
attorneys, and recorded roundtables on the threat posed by Islamic
law.90 The Article 11 coalition and the Malaysian Bar Council went

86. Shamala Sathiyaseelan, [2004] 2 M.L.J. at 660.
87. Id. at 659.
88. Shamala attempted to appeal the ruling, but the Federal Court dismissed
the appeal without considering the constitutional questions on the grounds that she
was in contempt of court for denying Jeyaganesh his visitation rights.
89. ARTICLE 11 COALITION, http://www.article11.org/ (last visited Mar. 2,
2010). The website has since been closed.
90. See The Coalition Called Article 11: Myth and Facts, ALIRAN (Mar. 27,
2007), http://aliran.com/aliran-monthly/2006/200611/the-coalition-called-article11-myths-and-facts/ (discussing how the Article 11 coalition has also sent an open
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on to organize a series of public forums across Malaysia. The road
show campaign was coupled with a petition to the Prime Minister,
signed by 20,000 concerned Malaysians, calling on the government
to affirm “Malaysia shall not become a theocratic state.”91
It is not difficult to understand why the rulings roused deep
concern for some. Each case provided a clear example that the civil
courts were beginning to cede broad legal authority when issues
around Islam were involved, even when it meant trampling on
individual rights enshrined in the Federal Constitution and even when
non-Muslims were involved. Within the broad context of the dakwah
movement over the preceding three decades, liberal rights activists
understood the rulings as the failure of this last bastion of secular
law.
However, these cases evoked the worst fears among
conservatives as well. For conservatives, the cases were understood
as an attack on the autonomy of the shariah courts. In the Lina Joy
case, for example, the central focus of conservative discourse
concerned the implications of an adverse ruling on the Muslim
community’s ability to manage its own religious affairs in multireligious Malaysia. If the civil courts affirmed Joy’s individual right
to freedom of religion, it would essentially constitute a breakdown in
the autonomy of the shariah courts and a breach in the barrier that
conservatives understood Article 121(1A) to guarantee.
Conservative activists argued that human rights instruments are
focused exclusively on the individual and, as such, they are unable to
accommodate communal understandings of rights when they come in
tension with individual rights claims.92 Prominent Islamic Party of
Malaysia (PAS) Parliament Member Dzulkifli Ahmad lamented that
liberal activists could view the cases only from an individual rights
perspective and not see that such a framework necessarily
undermines the collective right of the Muslim community to govern
letter to the Prime Minister, organized public forums, and provided interviews and
press releases).
91. Id.; Open Letter: Reaffirming the Supremacy of the Federal Constitution,
PETITION ONLINE, http://www.petitiononline.com/constsup/petition.html (last
visited Apr. 22, 2014).
92. This specific point was made by several prominent Islamic NGO leaders in
personal interviews. Interview with Zaid Kamaruddin, Head of Jamaah Islah
Malaysia, in Kuala Lumpur, Malay. (June 25, 2009); Interview with Yusri
Mohammad, Head of ABIM, in Kuala Lumpur, Malay. (June 30, 2009).
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its own affairs.93 For Dzulkifli and others, adverse rulings in any of
the cases involving Article 121(1A) would be tantamount to
“abolishing and dismantling the Shariah Court.”94 For conservatives,
individual rights talk is marked by an expansionist and even an
“imperialist” orientation. Just as discourse among liberal rights
activists is marked by fear that individual rights faced an imminent
threat, a deep anxiety set in among those who wished to protect what
they viewed as the collective rights of the Muslim community.
Of course an understanding of the religious community as the
legitimate bearer of rights obfuscates the issue of how religious
authority was constructed in Malaysia in the first place. As we have
seen, the legal dilemmas concerning the authority and jurisdiction of
the shariah courts were not the result of an inherent or essential
tension between the Islamic legal tradition and individual rights.
Rather, these legal dilemmas were the result of the state’s specific
formalization and institutionalization of state law. The bifurcation of
the legal system into parallel jurisdictions had hard-wired the legal
system to produce legal tensions.
Liberal rights groups were not the only organizations to mobilize
in the name of freedom of religion. A group of lawyers calling
themselves Lawyers in Defense of Islam (Peguam Pembela Islam)
held a press conference to announce their formation at the Federal
Territories Shariah Court Building on July 13, 2006. Their explicit
aim was to “take action to defend the position of Islam” in direct
response to the activities of the Article 11 coalition. A few days later,
a broad array of conservative Muslim NGOs united in a coalition
calling itself Muslim Organizations for the Defense of Islam
(Pertubuhan-Pertubuhan Pembela Islam), or Defenders (PEMBELA)
for short. PEMBELA brought together over fifty Muslim
organizations including ABIM, Jamaah Islah Malaysia (JIM), the
Shariah Lawyers’ Association of Malaysia (PGSM), and the Muslim
Professionals Forum. The founding statement for PertubuhanPertubuhan Pembela Islam explains that the immediate motivation
for organizing were the Article 121(1A) cases which, in their view,
challenged “the position of Islam in the Constitution and the legal
system of this country.”95
93. This view was summed up in the title of Dzulkifli Ahmed’s book on the
topic, Blind Spot. DZULKIFLI AHMAD, BLIND SPOT: THE ISLAMIC STATE DEBATE,
NEP, AND OTHER ISSUES (2007).
94. Id. at 153.
95. Press Release, PEMBELA, “Pertubuhan-Pertubuhan Pembela Islam
Desak Masalah Murtad Ditangani Secara Serius” [Defenders of Islam Urge More
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Conservative NGOs organized dozens of public forums and
flooded the Malay language press with hundreds more articles and
opinion pieces on the need to defend the autonomy of the shariah
courts from outside interference. Demonstrating their grassroots
support, PEMBELA submitted a 700,000-signature petition to the
Prime Minister, dwarfing the 20,000 signatures that Article 11
coalition was able to muster.
Civil society groups fundamentally shaped popular
understandings of what was at stake for the future of Malaysia.96
Rather than understanding these conundrums as the result of
Malaysian positive law and the institutional structure of the
Malaysian judiciary, the vast majority of Malaysians came to
understand the cases as reflecting inherent and unavoidable tensions
of liberal rights versus Islamic law, individual rights versus collective
rights, and secularism versus religion.
V. THE PARADOX
MALAYSIA

AND

POLITICS

OF

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

IN

The political spectacle accompanying these cases exacerbated
the dilemmas that attorneys, judges, and everyday citizens
encountered in their efforts to maneuver through the Malaysian legal
system. In the past, attorneys had found pragmatic ways of helping
Malaysians change their official legal status, in spite of lacunas in the
law. Malaysians had been able to secure state recognition of
conversion by affirming a statutory declaration before a
commissioner of oaths and registering a new name in the civil court
registry through a deed poll.97 With these two documents, an
individual could then secure a new identity card reflecting the name
change, which signified one’s new, non-Muslim status.98 For most
purposes, including marriage, one could then go on with life as one
wished. The compartmentalization of different personal status laws
Seriousness in Handling the Apostasy Problem] (July 17, 2006) (on file with
author).
96. For a more detailed examination of these dynamics, see Moustafa, supra
note 62. For more on lay understandings of Islamic law in Malaysia, see Tamir
Moustafa, Islamic Law, Women’s Rights, and Popular Legal Consciousness in
Malaysia, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 168 (2013).
97. A statutory declaration is the equivalent of an affidavit. A deed poll is a
legal statement to express an intention.
98. Salbiah Ahmad, Islam in Malaysia: Constitutional and Human Rights
Perspectives, 2 MUSLIM WORLD J. HUM. RTS. 10–11 (2005).
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for Muslims and non-Muslims and their entrenchment in parallel civil
and shariah court jurisdictions still afforded workable solutions for
individuals and couples attempting to negotiate their way between the
two legal regimes.
Early Article 121(1A) cases percolated up through the civil
courts beginning soon after the 1988 constitutional amendment, but
cases did not command popular attention until the Lina Joy and
Shamala cases. Attorneys recount that, prior to Lina Joy and
Shamala, shariah court judges had regularly facilitated the official
recognition of conversion out of Islam when they were called upon.99
But once the cases became a focal point of public debate, intense
pressures engulfed both the shariah and the civil courts. This
politicized environment made it difficult even for sympathetic shariah
court judges to facilitate state recognition of conversion out of
Islam.100 Likewise, intense political pressure made it difficult for civil
court judges to adopt different interpretations of Article 121(1A) that
might enable the civil courts to intervene when fundamental liberties
were in jeopardy. Instead, the civil courts ceded authority to the
shariah courts in virtually all the subsequent cases that involved the
fact patterns of Lina Joy and Shamala.
Shamala and Lina Joy underline some of the paradoxes,
ambiguities, and indeterminacies of “religious freedom” that fuel a
politics of religious freedom. The first and most apparent paradox is
that both sides emphatically demanded freedom from state
interference in religious life, yet both sides were also reliant on state
power to enforce diametrically opposed visions of religious freedom.
This apparent contradiction underlines the fact that both the concept
of religious freedom and the politics of religious freedom are
fundamentally rooted in the legal and judicial mechanisms of the
modern state. Absent the power and reach of the modern state, there
would be no strident debate over how to order and regulate society. A
closer look at the origins of the cases further reveals that the legal
conundrums are rooted in complex, interlocking dilemmas that
involve the juridification of race and religion and competing state and
federal jurisdictions, both of which were part of the state building
process and both of which are direct legacies of the British colonial
project. The fact that these dilemmas are interlocking, and each
99. Interviews with Latheefa Koya and Fadiah Nadwa Fikri, Attorneys, in
Kuala Lumpur, Malay. (June 29, 2009).
100. This was true even for Chinese and Indian Malaysians who had converted
to Islam for marriage, but wished to change their legal status back to their original
faith after the death of a spouse or the failure of a marriage.
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backed by entrenched political and economic interests, suggests that
these quandaries are not going away anytime soon.
Ironically, the tools and institutions that we instinctively turn to
for justice—law and courts—are, in fact, principal sources of tension
in the politics of religious liberty in Malaysia. Instead of resolving
legal questions, the court system is hard-wired to produce legal
controversies anew. Rather than simply arbitrate between contending
parties, the courts exacerbate ideological cleavages.101 And instead of
assuaging uncertainties, courts in Malaysia repeatedly instill a
tremendous degree of uncertainty, indeterminacy, and anxiety around
the meaning and content of “religious freedom.”

101. As discussed, many of the civil society groups that had mobilized around
Lina Joy formed as a direct result of the cases themselves. These include the Article
11 Coalition, PEMBELA, and several of their constituent organizations. See supra
text accompanying notes 90, 95.

